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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and the August 16, 1993 request of the Utah Court of
Appeals for a response from defendants/appellees to the Petition
for Rehearing ("Rehearing Petition", or "Reh. Pet.") filed by the
plaintiffs/appellants ("Plaintiffs"), these defendants/appellees
("State Defendants"J1 respectfully submit this response.
I.

THE JULY 9f 1990 AMENDMENT TO THE JUNE 6, 1989 ORDER IN
HARRIS REINSTATED ONLY A CAUSE OF ACTION AND RELATED
FACTS WHICH WERE NOT, AND ARE NOT, AT ISSUE IN THE
INSTANT CASE, EITHER IN THE COURT BELOW OR IN THE
APPEAL BEFORE THIS COURT, AND THEREFORE THE UTAH
SAVINGS STATUTE CANNOT BE APPLIED.
In its opinion dated July 20, 1993/ this Court affirmed the

lower Court's dismissal of Count I of the complaint, finding
Count I had not been filed within the time allowed under Utah
Code Ann- § 78-12-40 (1993).

This Court determined Utah Code

Ann. § 78-12-40 (1992) ("Utah Savings Statute"), the statute
cited by Plaintiffs to preserve Count I, could not be invoked,
because all causes of action Harris2, which Plaintiffs used to
invoke the Utah Savings Statute with respect to Count I, had been
dismissed with prejudice by Order of the Harris Court dated June
6, 1990 ("Judgment of Dismissal") (Addendum 1 hereto).

1

The term "State Defendants" is the same designation used
for these defendants/appellees in their initial appellate brief.
The State Defendants are: the State of Utah; the Utah Department
of Financial Institutions; George Sutton, individually, as Utah
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, and as Trustee of the
retained assets of Murray First Thrift and Loan; and Elaine B.
Weis, individually, and as former Utah Commissioner of Financial
Institutions.
2

Harris, et al. v. Weis, et al.. Case No. C87-0041S
(United States District Court for the District of Utah).
1

In their Rehearing Petition, Plaintiffs correctly point out
the Judgment of Dismissal was later amended.

Plaintiffs insist

this means the cause of action in Harris on which they rely to
invoke the Utah Savings Statute was thus dismissed "otherwise
than on the merits", so they may invoke the Utah Saving Statute
to preserve Count I.
Plaintiffs are correct in stating the Judgment of Dismissal
was amended.

On July 9,3 1990, the Hon. David Sam entered an

Order under Rule 60(b)(1) ("Rule 60(b)(1) Order") (Addendum 2
hereto), F.R.C.P., granting the relief the Harris plaintiffs had
requested.

However, it is important to examine that Rule

60(b)(1) Order and the related pleadings and orders, as set forth
in the record before the instant Court, to see just what relief
the Harris plaintiffs in that action requested, and what relief
Judge Sam granted at that time.
In his September 30, 1988 "Ruling and Order" (Rec. at 14857) (Addendum 3 hereto), Judge Sam made his findings, and then
ruled:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first, second, third,
fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth (as to derivative
claims and as to direct claims against the non-state
defendants), ninth, and eleventh claims of the amended
complaint, together with the corresponding claims of the
second amended complaint, are dismissed on the merits and
with prejudice.

3

Plaintiffs state Judge Sam entered this Rule 60(b)(1)
Order on July 20, 1990. [Reh. Pet. at 2.] Although it is not a
material point, the copy of the Order in the record before this
Court which contains the language quoted by Plaintiffs in their
Rehearing Petition is dated July 9, 1990, and was entered on July
11, 1990. [Rec. at 260-61.]
2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the
State of Utah and its officers in their official
capacities are dismissed on the merits and with
prejudice.
This order does not dismiss the eighth claim of the
amended complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the
second amended complaint, insofar as it asserts a claim
against the state defendants in their individual
capacities, nor does it dismiss the tenth claim of the
amended complaint as replaced by the ninth claim of the
second amended complaint. Aside from these exceptions,
all claims and this entire action are hereby dismissed on
the merits and with prejudice as to all defendants.
Defendants are entitled to their costs.
(Emphasis added.) (Rec. at 156-57.)
Six months later, several of the defendants in Harris moved
for entry of judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice.

On

April 21, 1989, Judge Sam entered the following "Ruling"
(Addendum 4 hereto):A
4

Whether Judge Sam's April 21, 1989 Ruling — dismissing
ALL CLAIMS against ALL DEFENDANTS ON THE MERITS AND WITH
PREJUDICE — was intended to supersede his September 30, 1988
"Ruling and Order" — which would not have dismissed certain
counts involving the State defendants in their individual
capacities — need not be argued here. That Ruling, and the
motion(s) which led to it, does negate, however, the insinuations
in Footnote 1 of Plaintiffs' Rehearing Petition, which implies
some sinister motive to the State defendants in not submitting
their Order based upon the Court's September 8, 1988 Ruling and
Order until after Plaintiffs' counsel had withdrawn. At last
count, since the Commissioner took possession of the business and
property of MFT&L on July 22, 1982, Plaintiffs had used well over
40 different lawyers at various phases of their disputes with the
Commissioner and related entities. The "Who's In, and Who's Out"
maneuvers of Mr. McDonald and Mr. Leedy, with respect to the
filing of the First, Second, and Third Amended Complaints in the
Harris proceedings (see September 30, 1988 "Ruling and Order"),
illustrates how difficult it probably would have been for counsel
for the State defendants NOT to have submitted a proposed order
at a time shortly after one of Plaintiffs' counsel had just
withdrawn — no matter when State defendants' counsel might have
submitted a proposed order. As the April 21, 1989 Ruling shows,
however, this was not a case of State defendants' counsel waiting
for seven months after Judge Sam had entered his September 30,
1988 "Ruling and Order" before State defendants' counsel
submitted an order implementing that "Ruling and Order" (and, as

3

On March 31, 1989, several defendants moved for
entry of judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice in
the above entitled matter. The time for responding to
defendants' motion having now expired without any
opposition having been filedr and it appearing to the
court that all claims in the case have now been
dismissed, defendants' motion is granted.
The court
requests the movants to coordinate with other defense
counsel to prepare an appropriate final order and
judgment for the court's signature and to circulate the
same for approval as to form pursuant to Rule 13(e) of
the Civil Rules of Procedure.
(Rec. at 158. )
Subsequently,

on

May

18, 1989,5

counsel

for

the

State

Plaintiffs would now have us believe, until after Plaintiffs'
counsel had withdrawn from this case). Rather, on March 31,
1989, six months after the entry of the "Ruling and Order",
"several defendants moved for entry of judgment dismissing all
claims with prejudice in the above entitled matter", and, twenty
days later, when no objections had been filed to the motion,
Judge Sam entered a "Ruling" granting the motion. The June 5,
1989 "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" was not in response
to Judge Sam's "Ruling and Order" of September 30, 1988, but was
rather in response to the April 21, 1989 "Ruling" of Judge Sam
granting of the motion(s) of "several defendants", which
motion(s) had been filed on March 21, 1989. Judge Sam had before
him an entirely separate motion. Unfortunately, the motion(s)
filed by the "several defendants" are not in the record before
the instant Court, so there is no way to determine whether those
"several defendants" raised points in the motion(s) which
convinced Judge Sam to revise his thinking in his September 30,
1988 "Ruling and Order" and decide ALL CAUSES OF ACTION with
respect to ALL DEFENDANTS should be dismissed with prejudice.
This apparently was not the case, since Judge Sam did amend his
July 5, 1989 "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" through his
July 9, 1990 Rule 60(b)(1) Order. However, the "several
defendants" having made their motion (which one assumes was
supported with a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities"), and no
objection having been filed thereto, it was certainly reasonable
for counsel for those "several defendants" to assume Judge Sam
had been influenced by their arguments and had changed his mind
about not dismissing the State defendants in their individual
capacities or certain claims against those State defendants.
Thus, no sinister motive can be imputed to counsel for the State
defendants, or counsel for any of the other defendants, in
Harris.
5

The date on the certificate of mailing shows the proposed
order was mailed to counsel of record on May 18, 1989. (Rec. at
163.) The date stamp on the copy in the record shows it was
4

Defendants6 submitted

to all counsel a proposed

Dismissal with Prejudice".
Dismissal on June 5, 1989.

"Judgment of

Judge Sam signed this Judgment of
(Rec. at 161.) The Judgment provided:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
pursuant to Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that all claims in the Amended Complaint, together with
the corresponding claims of the Second Amended Complaint
are dismissed with prejudice.
(Rec. at 161-62.)
At that point, all causes of action in the First and Second
Amended complaints had been dismissed with prejudice.

The Harris

Plaintiffs recognized this, because they had to petition Judge
Same under Rule 60(b)(1) to amend the Judgment of Dismissal to
reinstate a cause of action.
the Rule 60(b)(1) Order.

On July 9, 1990, Judge Sam signed

That Order, in its entirety, reads as

follows:
Plaintiffs, Gary S. Harris, et al., have moved this
court for relief from the June 5, 1989 Judgment of
Dismissal to the extent that it relates to the ninth
claim of the second amended complaint which alleges a
state law claim for defamation.
This court has already indicated in its Order dated
February 27, 1990, that it did not intend to dismiss that
claim with prejudice but that dismissal was only for lack
of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the relief requested by
plaintiffs is hereby granted.
(Emphasis supplied.) (Rec. at 260.)
Thus Judge Sam only granted the relief reguested by
"Plaintiffs, Gary S. Harris, et al.", and that relief reguested
was only with respect to the "June 5, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal

received in Judge Sam's office on May 19, 1989.
6

Christensen, Jensen & Powell and the Utah Attorney
General's Office represented the State defendants, and Kipp &
Christian represented the State's insurance carriers.
5

to the extent that it relates to the ninth claim of the second
amended complaint which alleges a state law claim for defamation"
(emphasis added).

Plaintiffs did not request relief with respect

to the June 5, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal to the extent it
relates to "the eighth claim of the amended complaint as replaced
by the eighth claim of the second amended complaint, insofar as
it asserts a claim against the state defendants in their
individual capacities", even though Judge Sam had also ruled to
that effect in his September 30, 1988 Ruling and Order.

Since in

his Rule 60(b)(1) Order Judge Sam granted only the relief
requested, it follows he did not amend his June 5, 1989 Judgment
of Dismissal to reinstate "the eighth claim of the amended
complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the second amended
complaint, insofar as it asserts a claim against the state
defendants in their individual capacities".
The ninth claim of the Second Amended Complaint (Addendum 5
hereto) shows it relates only to certain defamatory statements
allegedly made about Gary S. Harris, a plaintiff in Harris, by
former Commissioners of Financial Institutions Elaine B. Weis and
George Sutton, and by Darwin M. Larsen and Ed H. Throndsen.
(Rec. at 381-86.)

The ninth claim in the Second Amended

Complaint has nothing to do with MFT&L, or the Plaintiffs in the
instant appeal, or any of the facts surrounding MFT&L or any of
the Plaintiffs in the instant appeal1

That limited cause of

action in the ninth claim was also recognized by from Judge Sam's
Rule 60(b)(1) Order, in which Judge Sam says "the ninth claim of

6

the second amended complaint . . . alleges a state law claim for
defamation."
The eighth claim in the Second Amended Complaint arguably
could relate to the Complaint filed with the Court below in the
instant appeal —

the eighth claim was for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for actions allegedly taken by at least some of the
State Defendants in the instant appeal.

Some of the Plaintiffs

in the instant action were the same as some of the Plaintiffs in
Harris, and some of the facts arguably were the same.

HOWEVER,

plaintiffs in Harris did not ask Judge Sam to amend his June 6,
1989 Judgment of Dismissal to reinstate the eighth claim, and
thus it remains "dismissed with prejudice".

Nor do the State

Defendants believe the Harris plaintiffs could, at this late
date, successfully submit another Rule 60(b)(1) motion to Judge
Sam for him to again amend his June 6, 1989 Judgment of
Dismissal.

Through their motion which resulted in Judge Sam's

July 9, 1990 Rule 60(b)(1) Order, plaintiffs in Harris showed
they had knowledge of the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal.
The Harris plaintiffs also showed they knew some of the
provisions of the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal did not
comport with Judge Sam's September 30, 1989 Ruling and Order;
however, the Harris plaintiffs asked Judge Sam only to amend the
June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal to reinstate the ninth claim,
relating only to the alleged defamation of Gary Harris; they did
not ask the Court to amend the June 6, 1989 Judgment of Dismissal
to reinstate the eighth claim, which related to MFT&L and some of
the Plaintiffs in the instant appeal.
7

Therefore, as State Defendants stated in their brief and at
oral argument, the allegations with respect to a breach in Harris
were dismissed with prejudice by that Court, and the instant
Court was correct when it affirmed the dismissal by the Court
below of Count I, since that part of Harris on which the
Plaintiffs in the instant case relied to invoke the Utah Savings
Statute was dismissed by Judge Sam with prejudice in his June 6,
1989 Judgment of Dismissal.
II.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF RECONSIDERATION OF THE
AFFIRMATION BY THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF DISMISSAL
OF COUNT TWO IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION.
In dismissing Count II of the Complaint, this Court

recognized the obligation which Count II alleged the State
Defendants as to have breached as having arisen on or about June
13, 1983, at the conclusion of the six month period after
execution by all the relevant parties of the Purchase and
Assumption Agreement ("P&A").

In their Rehearing Petition,

however, Plaintiffs now assert the Court incorrectly failed to
recognize Plaintiffs had argued in Paragraph XXXI of their
Complaint:
Alternatively, the P & A Agreement contained an implied
promise that Sutton and the DFI would turn over the
retained assets to MFT&L and terminate their role in
connection therewith at the earliest possible time
consistent with Sutton's7 statutory responsibilities.
7

Presumably, Plaintiffs mean "the Commissioner's statutory
responsibilities", rather than "Sutton's statutory
responsibilities", since Mr. Sutton not only was not Commissioner
on December 13, 1982, when the P&A Agreement was signed (he was
Commissioner from April 11, 1987 to and through May 31, 1992), he
wasn't even employed by the Department of Financial Institutions
of the State of Utah at that time.
8

Plaintiffs assert there has always been a question of fact
as to whether the P&A Agreement included a certain letter, dated
November 5, 1982, which contained language supposedly requiring
the Commissioner to surrender possession of any retained assets
of MFT&L six months after the execution of the P&A Agreement.
Plaintiffs argue this factual dispute is the basis of their
factual assertion in Paragraph XXXI of their Complaint, and
assert Paragraph XXXI presented an alternative under which the
Commissioner's obligation to turn over any retained assets did
not arise on June 13, 1983, but rather at some point apparently
much later, which was at "the earliest possible time consistent
with Sutton's statutory responsibilities".

Plaintiffs now inform

the Court they "could indeed 'prove a set of facts in support of
[their] claims' which would not be time-barred." (Reh. Pet. at 5
(brackets in original).)
This issue is raised for the first time in the Petition for
Rehearing.

An issue which was not adequately raised and ruled

upon in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

Rees v. Intermountain Health Care,. 808 P.2d 1069, 1075-

76 (Utah 1991); Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ, 797 p>2d
412,413 (Utah 1990); Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development
Co., et al., 659 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Utah 1983).

Furthermore,

even if the issue could have been raised on appeal, Plaintiffs
waived their right to raise it by not raising it in their initial
brief.

See Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395

(Utah 1980).

An appellate court will ordinarily not consider

issues raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.
9

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d

1100, 1112 (Utah App.), cert, denied,

817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); Lockhart Company v. Anderson, 646 P.2d
648 (Utah 1982),

As such, this argument must be rejected.

In

none of the several pleadings Plaintiffs filed with the Court8
below did they make this argument, or even hint at it.

Nor did

Plaintiffs raise this point in either their initial appellate
brief or their reply brief, or at oral argument.

Aside from

putting the above-quoted language into Paragraph XXXI of their
Complaint, and repeating it verbatim in their factual allegations
in paragraph 17 of their initial brief9, Plaintiffs never
referred to this language or asserted Paragraph XXXI might allege
facts constituting still another breach in Count II.
The placement of the factual allegations in Count II and
within the "Statement of Facts" in Plaintiffs' initial brief is
instructive in analyzing Plaintiffs' argument a new breach was
alleged in Paragraph XXXI.

Summarized, the allegations in

Paragraphs XXIX through XXXXII of the Complaint (and paragraphs
15-24 of the Statement of Facts in Plaintiffs' initial brief)
are:

8

Plaintiffs filed the following pleadings below:
"Complaint" (Rec. at 2-48); "Response to Motion to Dismiss" and
"Memorandum of Points and Authorities" (Rec. at 93-181);
"Response to Motion to Dismiss" and "Memorandum of Points and
Authorities" (Rec. at 182-298); "Supplemental Memorandum in
Response to Motion to Dismiss Filed by DFI, Sutton and Weis; and
Reply in Support of Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint;
and Motion to Strike Notice to Submit for Decision" (Rec. at 334408).
9

Plaintiffs repeated verbatim most of the facts alleged in
their Complaint verbatim in their "Statement of Facts" in their
initial brief.
10

XXIX

The P&A Agreement required the Commissioner to
turn over the retained assets of MFT&L within 6
months after the P&A Agreement was signed

XXX

The Commissioner breached the requirement in
Paragraph XXIX by not turning over the assets

XXXI

Alternatively, the P&A Agreement contained an
implied promise Sutton would turn over the assets

XXXII

Sutton and DFI agreed not to impede the sale or
development of the Bel Marin Keys Property ("BMK")

XXXIII

Plaintiffs have performed all their obligations
under the P&A Agreement

XXXIV

Despite repeated demands by Plaintiffs, Sutton and
DFI refused to turn over any retained assets

XXXV
through
XXXXII

These paragraphs detain the alleged sale of BMK,
and how the sale of BMK by Sutton allegedly
violated the terms of the P&A Agreement

One is left to wonder whether Count II alleged one, two,
three breaches.

For example, Plaintiffs' initial brief stated:

Like Count One,
the breach of a
Agreement. The
between May and

Count Two alleges a cause of action for
written contract, i.e., the P & A
breaches are alleged to have occurred
November of 1987.

In this statement, Plaintiffs appear to assert the alleged
"breaches" asserted Count II occurred "between May and November
of 1987", which would seem to mean the sale of BMK.

This seems

rather inconsistent, however, with the numerous arguments in
Plaintiffs' pleadings in the Court below, and in Plaintiffs'
briefs on appeal, which assert the claim of breach in Count II
was kept alive under the Utah Savings Statute by Nelson10 and
Harris.

Nelson was filed May 30, 1986 (Plaintiffs' initial brief

10

Frank A. Nelson, et al. v. First Security Financial,
Inc., et al., Case No. C86-2894 (United States District Court for
the Northern District of California).
11

at 17), so it obviously couldn't refer to alleged breaches which
would take place in May through November of 1987. Nor could
Harris, which was filed January 22, 1987 (Plaintiffs' initial
brief at 19). Rather, the breaches alleged in Nelson and Harris
both had to refer to the alleged breach of the P&A Agreement at
the end of the six month period after December 13, 1982.
Presumably, the breach referred to in Paragraph XXXI does
not refer to the sale of BMK, for the following reasons:
a.

As pointed out above, Plaintiffs made their the

specific allegations regarding the BMK sale in eight (8) separate
paragraphs in Count Two of the Complaint, repeated these
allegations in other pleadings filed with the Court below, and
repeated the allegations in their initial and reply briefs filed
on appeal.

Thus the specifics of the allegations relating to the

sale of BMK were known to the Court below and to this Court, and
both rejected the assertion the breach occurred when BMK was
sold, determining instead the breach occurred at the end of the
six-month period which began December 13, 1982.
b.

In their Rehearing Petition, Plaintiffs do not assert

the BMK sale constituted the breach they claim to have asserted
in Paragraph XXXI.
c.

Sequentially, in Count Two of the Complaint, the

assertion in Paragraph XXXI immediately follows the paragraphs
which allege the Commissioner was required to turn over the
assets within 6 months after the signing of the P&A Agreement.
There are three more paragraphs before the sale of BMK begins
being discussed.
12

d.

As pointed out above, in their initial brief, and in

their reply brief, Plaintiffs argue the breach they assert in
Count II IS the sale of BMK.
e.

The wording of Paragraphs XXX and XXXI does not

indicate Plaintiffs thought there were two different of breaches;
rather, the wording of these two paragraphs indicates Plaintiffs
believed the Commissioner was obligated to return the assets to
the Plaintiffs, either (1) within six months after the signing of
the P&A Agreement, as expressly required by the November 5, 1982
letter, or (2) when the Commissioner had fulfilled his statutory
responsibilities, as impliedly required by the P&A Agreement
itself.

Again, Plaintiffs argued the first scenario in other

pleadings before the lower Court and in its initial and reply
briefs on appeal, but Plaintiffs never raised the alleged breach
of the second scenario until they submitted their Rehearing
Petition,
To what breach, then, does the allegation in Paragraph XXXI
refer?

To six months after December 13, 1982?

If so, this Court

has already determined Count II was filed beyond the statute of
limitations-

To the sale of BMK in 1987?

If so, this Court has

already correctly determined the alleged breach actually took
place June 13, 1983, with the sale of BMK in 1987 being just a
further result of that breach.

To still a third alleged breach?

If so, it has been raised for the first time in the Petition for
Rehearing, and must therefore be rejected by this Court.
In reality, Paragraph XXXI appears to have been a fall-back
position in the event a court were to determine the November 5,
13

19 82 letter was not a part of the P&A Agreement.
position Plaintiffs now appear to take —

Regardless, the

that Paragraph XXXI

asserts a third breach in addition to the one which took place on
June 13, 1982, and the one which took place in November of 1987 - was never argued in the Court below nor on appeal, and is
inconsistent with the positions Plaintiffs took whenever Count II
was discussed or argued.
III. EVEN SHOULD THE COURT REVERSE ITSELF ON EITHER OR BOTH OF
ITS RULINGS ON COUNT I AND COUNT II OF ITS JULY 20, 1993
DECISION, THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF BOTH
COUNTS BY THE COURT BELOW FOR ANY OF THE NUMBER OF
ADDITIONAL REASONS PRESENTED BY DEFENDANTS.
Should this Court determine it was in error when it issued
its July 20, 1993 opinion, either as to Count I or Count II, or
both, the State Defendants still submit this Court should affirm
the dismissal by the Court below for each of the reasons set
forth by the State Defendants in their initial brief, and at oral
argument.

Perhaps the most compelling reason for dismissal is

the assets of MFT&L retained by the Commissioner were always
under the jurisdiction of the Court with jurisdiction over the
MFT&L proceedings.11

The Commissioner never did anything with

any asset of MFT&L without first submitting a petition to the
MFT&L Court, giving notice to all interested parties (including
all the Plaintiffs in the instant proceedings), and receiving the
approval of the MFT&L Court. While the MFT&L Court could only
reverse the determinations of the Commissioner if the MFT&L Court
11

In re the Possession by the Banking Commissioner of
Murray First Thrift and Loan Company, Case No. 820905951 (Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah).

14

found those determinations to be "arbitrary, capricious,
fraudulent, or otherwise contrary to law" (Utah Code Ann. § 7-212(1) (Supp. 1993), the MFT&L Court was well aware of the P&A
Agreement; indeed, that Court had originally approved the P&A
Agreement, and continued to have jurisdiction over it.
Plaintiffs often raised their objection to the Commissioner's
continued possession of the remaining assets of MFT&L.

If their

interpretation of the P&A Agreement was correct, the Court could
have rejected the Commissioner's determinations as being
"contrary to law", because they would have violated a contract
(the P&A Agreement) which had been approved by the MFT&L Court.
The MFT&L Court continually rejected the Plaintiffs' position, as
should this Court.
For each of the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants
respectfully move the Court to deny the Plaintiffs' Rehearing
Petition, or, in the alternative, to affirm the dismissal of
Counts I and II by the Court below for any or all of the
additional reasons cited by the State Defendants in their brief
and at oral argument
Dated this

ML

day of September, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JJZ.
BtfYfcEfa.PETTEY A
Assistant Attorney General
iera
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Scott Mitchell
LEHMAN, MITCHELL & WALDO
136 South Main Street, Suite 721
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Earl Spafford
L. Charles Spafford
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD
425 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Michael N. Emery
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
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ATTEST: A TRUE COPY
MARKUS B. 2IMMER. CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH

BY

DEPUTY CLERK ^

Attorneys for Defendants Elaine B. Weis, George Sutton,
P. Scott Baker, Kary Amidan, Robert S. Gale and the
State of Utah
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
GARY S. HARRIS, et al.,
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. C 87-0041S

ELAINE B. WEIS, et al.,
Defendants.

The court, having entered its Order of Entry of Judgment
on

, 1989,
IT IS HZRE3Y ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant

to Rule 54(b) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that all claims

^

in the Amended Complaint, together vith the corresponding claims
of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed vith prejudice.
DATED this

£ ** day of

-V^c

, 1989,

Honorable Davis Sam
U. S. District Court Judge
Copies trailed to 6/6/89:dp
See attached list
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Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD & BULLEN
American Plaza III
47 West 200 South #450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Richard J. Leedy
Attorney at Law
230 East 300 South #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
David L. Wilkinson
Stephen J. Sorenson
Bryce Pettey
Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Carman E. Kipp
Gregory J. Sanders
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
City Centre I, Suite 330
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jack C. Helgesen
HELGESEN & WATERFALL
4768 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 84403
Gayle F. McKeachnie
NIELSEN & SENIOR
363 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
R. Stephen Marshall
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50 South Main Street, #1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

GARY S. HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiff(s),
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
UNDER RULE 60(b)(1)

vs.
ELAINE B. WEIS, et al.,

Civil No. 87-C-0041-S

Defendant(s).

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Plaintiffs,
relief

Gary S. H a r r i s , e t a l . , h a v e moved t h i s c o u r t f o r

from t h e June 5 , 1989 Judgment o f D i s m i s s a l t o t h e e x t e n t

t h a t i t r e l a t e s t o t h e n i n t h c l a i m of t h e s e c o n d amended c o m p l a i n t
v h i c h a l l e g e s a s t a t e law c l a i m f o r d e f a m a t i o n .
T h i s c o u r t h a s a l r e a d y i n d i c a t e d i n i t s Order d a t e d February
27,

1990,

that

it

did not

p r e j u d i c e but t h a t

dismissal

intend

to

dismiss

that

was o n l y f o r l a c k of

claim

with

jurisdiction.

A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d by p l a i n t i f f s i s h e r e b y g r a n t e d .
DATED t h i s
a t t y s 7/ll/90sm
y G. Mart^eau, Esq.
axon Green, Esq.
y G. Haslam, Esq.
•nss R. Holbrook Esq.
ry F. Bendinger, Esq.
terW B i l l i n g s Es.q
C. Helgesen, Esq.
*e railing l i s t attached
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Sharon Green, Esq.
722 Montgomery St. #25
San Francisco, CA 94111
Roy G. Kaslarn, Esq.
BIELE, HASLAM, HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
James R. Holbrook, Esq.
R. Willis Orton, Esq.
Russell Kearl, Esq.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
800 Kennecott Bldg.
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Gary F. Eendinger, Esq.
Scott A. Call, Esq.
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX & BENDINGER
500 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Peter W. Billings, Jr., Esq.
Michele Mitchell, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Jack C. Helgesen, Esq.
HELGESEN & WATERFALL
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Ogden, UT 84401

R. Stephen Marshall, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL £ MCCARTHY
P. O. Box 45340
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Leroy S. Axland, Esq.
Jerold G. Oldroyd, Esq.
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175 South West Terrple
Suite 700
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175 East Fourth South #900
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Kent H. Murdock, Esq.
Anthony B. Quinn, Esq.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
P. O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, UT 84145.
Carman E. Kipp, Esq.
Gregory J. Sanders, Esq.
175 East Fourth South
City Centre I Suite 330
Salt Lake Citv, UT fun.U
Stephen J. Sorenson, Esq.
Bryce Pettey, Esq.
Asst. Atty. General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Ray R. Christensen, Esq.
Jay E. Jensen, Esq.
Elwood P. Powell, Esq.
Denton Hatch, Esq.
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Gayle F. McKeachnie, Esq.
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J. Michael Wilkins, Esq.
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Dennis V. Haslam, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South
Suite 4004
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Henry S. Nygaard, Esq.
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Richard A. Rappaport, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City,, UT 84111
Allen M. Swan, Esq.
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330 South 300 East
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

GARY S. HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING AND ORDER

ELAINE B. WEIS, et al.,
Defendants.

)

Case No. 87-C-0041-S

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This matter

comes before

the

court

on plaintiffs1

and

defendants1 objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation advising the court to 1) dismiss plaintiffs1 second amended
complaint, and 2) grant Rule 11 sanctions against the plaintiffs
in the amount of $100 to each answering defendant.

Also pending

before this court are defendants1 motion to 1) strike plaintiffs1
objections to the report and recommendation, 2) strike plaintiffs1
3rd amended complaint, and 3) grant additional Rule 11 sanctions.
Before addressing the objections, some background may be
helpful.

On November 25, 1987, this court adopted the prior

reports and recommendations of the magistrate, dated July 17, 1987,
July 23, 1987 and August 10, 1987, granting, in part, defendants1
motions to dismiss.

Resolution of these reports and recommenda-

tions was significantly delayed by conflicts between plaintiffs and
their counsel.

The court, however, in an abundance of caution,

allowed plaintiffs until December 21, 1987 to amend the complaint
to cure defects noted by the magistrate, stating, "All claims
recommended for dismissal, which cannot be cured by filing an
amended complaint, will be dismissed with prejudice." As indicated
by the minute entry of November 20, 1987, and the ruling of
November 25, 1987, the court took particular caution to insure
plaintiffs were properly notified of its decision.
On December 21, 1987, Robert M. McDonald, on plaintiffs1
behalf, requested until December 31, 1987 to file a second amended
complaint. The court granted the request. On January 4, 1988, Mr.
McDonald again moved for an extension of time until January 15,
1988. The court again accommodated.

The second amended complaint

was filed January 15, 1988 by Richard J. Leedy, who has been
replaced by Mr. McDonald as plaintiffs1 counsel.

Defendants were

granted extensions of time and were allowed to file briefs in
excess of page limitations to support their motions to dismiss the
second amended complaint. Because the second amended complaint did
not cure "glaring errors" in the first amended complaint, which the
court

had

brought

to

plaintiffs1

attention,

the

magistrate

recommends dismissal of the second amended complaint and Rule 11
sanctions against plaintiffs in the amount of $100 per answering
defendant.

2
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On May 20, 1988, defendants Johnson and Jarman objected to the
report and recommendation

for two reasons.

First, it did not

address all of the grounds for dismissal raised by Johnson and
Jarman, including
(1)

There is no private right of action under
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act;

(2)

Plaintiffs1 civil rights claims do not allege
a constitutional violation and do not allege
conspiracy with the requisite particularity;

(3)

Plaintiffs1 fraud claims fail to satisfy the
particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(4)

Plaintiffs1 RICO and RICE claims fail to
adequately allege the requisite elements of
those alleged violations.

Second, the amount awarded under Rule 11 ($100 per defendant) was
allegedly insufficient to compensate for their fees. They request
a sanction of $5,080.
On May 23, 1988, plaintiffs, through new counsel Robert M.
McDonald, objected to dismissal of the second amended complaint and
sanctions for the following reasons:
(a) [T]he basis giving rise to the recommendation
arose by reason of the negligence of prior counsel who
drafted the Second Amended Complaint and failed to
correct the defects specifically enumerated by the
magistrate; (b) a litigant with a meritorous (sic) claim
should not be penalized by the inability of counsel to
properly state his claim and comply with simple procedural rules; (c) the Magistrate's recommendation is moot
inasmuch as Plaintiffs have filed a Third Amended
Complaint which they are permitted to do without leave
of Court pursuant to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. inasmuch as no

3

responsive pleading has been filed; (c) the Third Amended
Complaint (a copy of which is attached) and the Memorandum filed with this objection demonstrates that Plaintiffs have meritorous (sic) claims and that the problems
leading to the Magistrate's recommendation have been
corrected and are not dispositive of Plaintiffs1 claims.
On May 26, 1988, defendants Dobson and Van Winkle objected to
the report and recommendation asserting that the Rule 11 sanctions
should be increased to include all reasonable fees and costs
incurred after the filing of the defective second amended complaint.

They request $3,284.00.

On June 8, 1988, defendants Johnson and Jarman moved 1) to
strike plaintiffs1 objection to the report and recommendation
(together with the 3rd amended complaint), and 2) for further Rule
11 sanctions.

They assert the following:

1. With regard to plaintiffs1 Objection to Report
& Recommendation of the United States Magistrate,
plaintiffs chose not to foffer any opposition whatsoever
to Johnson's and Jarman s Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint prior to the Magistrate's determination
of that motion despite every opportunity to do so. The
objections they now raise, having never been raised
before the magistrate, should not be considered by the
Court.
2.
With regard to plaintiffs1 Third Amended
Complaint, plaintiffs have already used their one free
amendment under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and therefore have no right to file the Third
Amended Complaint absent leave of the Court. Further,
plaintiffs' claims in this action, as stated in the
Second Amended Complaint, have essentially been dismissed
with prejudice and therefore plaintiffs have no right to
amend their complaint without leave of the Court on that
ground as well.

4
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3.
Plaintiffs, and particularly their counsel,
Robert M. McDonald, have filed their Third Amended
Complaint and Objection to Report & Recommendation of the
United States Magistrate with no basis in fact or in law
for filing those pleadings. Therefore, under Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants Johnson
and Jarman should be awarded their reasonable attorneys1
fees incurred in bringing this motion.
On June 10, 198S, defendants Dobson and Van Winkle likewise
filed a motion to strike. On that same day, state defendants' also
joined in Johnson's and Jarman1s motion to strike.
Considering the case history and the failure of plaintiffs to
file a motion for leave of court to file a third amended complaint,
the third amended complaint is not properly before the court and
will not be considered.

The court rejects plaintiffs1 contention

that leave is not required because no responsive pleadings were
filed to the second amended complaint.

Plaintiffs9 Rule 15

opportunity to amend without leave was clearly used when the first
amended complaint was filed on February 12, 1987 without defendants' consent and without leave of court. The court stretched the
bounds of propriety first by allowing a second amended complaint
after resolution of defendants' motions to dismiss was significantly delayed due to failure of the plaintiffs to timely address the
magistrate's reports and recommendations, and second by granting
two subsequent motions to extend time to file an amended complaint.
In this situation, the contention that a third amended complaint,

5
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submitted May 23, 1988, some five months after the courtfs final
extended deadline, is allowed without leave of court and without
a proper motion is frivolous at best.

The court grants Rule 11

sanctions in the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in
moving to strike the third amended complaint, the amount of which
will be determined upon further hearing. Defendants1 motions to
strike the third amended complaint are granted.
The court turns its attention to the second amended complaint
and whether it cures the defective claims the magistrate previously
recommended dismissing.

If it does not, then, pursuant to the

courtfs ruling of November 25, 1987, these claims will be dismissed
with prejudice.

Upon review of both the first amended complaint

and the second, the court concludes that the defects were not
curable or were not cured. The magistrates report and recommendation of July 17, 1987, recommended dismissal of the claims of
plaintiffs

Harris, Hansen, Nelson,

Gordon,

and MIT Mortgage

Company, found in the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh,
eighth (as to its derivative claims), and eleventh claims of the
first amended complaint.

The July 17th report and recommendation

also recommended dismissal of the fourth claim for failure to state
a claim, in that no private right of action exists under fi 17 of
the Securities Act of 1933.

The eighth (as to claims for direct

injury), ninth, and tenth claims were not recommended for dismis6

t\s\i.'*t'm

sal*

The eighth claim was asserted against "all defendants11, the

ninth against the State of Utah only# and tenth against defendants
Weis, Sutton, Larsen, and Throndsen.
The court notes that the numbering of claims in the second
amended complaint corresponds to the numbering of claims in the
first, with one exception.

The ninth claim in the first amended

complaint is abandoned in the second and therefore claim ten in the
first amended complaint corresponds to claim nine in the second.
The only claim which follows the ninth claim in the second amended
complaint is not numbered but corresponds to claim eleven of the
first amended complaint.
The magistrate's report and recommendation of July 23, 1987
recommended dismissal of all claims against the State of Utah and
its officers in their official capacity.
The magistrates report and recommendation of August 10, 1987
recommended dismissal of the remaining claims found in the eighth
claim

(as to claims for direct injury) against the "non-state

defendants'1 for failure to state a claim, i.e., failure to plead
the elements of the claim with the requisite particularity.

It

also recommended dismissal of all claims of MFT Mortgage Company,
since the latter could not assert derivative claims (not being a
shareholder of any party) and asserted no claims for injury
directly to itself.

The issue of whether the eighth claim (as to
7

claims for direct injury) states a claim against the state defendants in their individual capacities remains open.
The claims of the first amended complaint which were not
susceptible to curative amendment by plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson,
Gordon, and MFT Mortgage Company and which have been recommended
for dismissal under prior reports and recommendations adopted by
this court are the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
seventh, eighth (as to derivative claims), ninth, and eleventh
claims*

The claims of the first amended complaint which were not

susceptible to curative amendment by plaintiff Harris are the
fourth and ninth claims.

The claims susceptible to curative

amendment by plaintiff Harris are the derivative claims found
within the first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and
eleventh claims, but only upon condition that plaintiffs 1) make
demand upon Citizens Bankshares, Thrift Holding Company, and
Charter Thrift £ Loan to bring a derivative action on behalf of
Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan; 2) obtain
permission of the state court supervising the receivership of
Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan to bring suit on
their behalf or against the receiver; 3) verify the second amended
complaint; and 4) join Citizens Bankshares, Thrift Holding Company,
and Charter Thrift & Loan as parties.

The eighth claim (as to

direct injury claims) remains in place against the state defendants
8
<Jc>o^-

in their individual capacities; against the non-state defendants
it is recommended for dismissal absent amendment sufficient to cure
its pleading deficiencies. The remaining claim not recommended for
dismissal is the tenth claim, which is plaintiff Harris1 claim for
defamation against defendants Weis, Sutton, Larsen, and Throndsen.
The state defendants are:

Elaine B. Weis, George R. Sutton,

State of Utah, Darwin M. Larsen, R. Scott Baker, Mary Amidan, and
Robert S. Gale.
The non-state defendants are Stanley A. Anderson, Robert B.
Beckstead, Mirvin D. Borthick, Dean G. Christensen, Richard A.
Christenson, W. Harold Dobson, John A. Firmage, Jr., Larry E.
Grant, Larry R. Hendricks, Robert L. Howe, Carl A. Hulbert, Edward
M. Jamison, John C. Jarman, Russell B. Jex, Charles E. Johnson,
Irene Jorgensen, Fred S. Kohlruss, Ronald C. Lease, T. Kay Lyman,
Paul A. Miller, Richard D. Paul, Richard M. Robinson, Ed H.
Throndsen, Richard A. Van Winkle, Dr. Terry Warner, First Security
Corporation, a corporation, First Security Financial, and Does 1
through 40.

The second amended complaint adds Thrift Holding

Company and Charter Thrift and Loan.
Plaintiffs do not contend that the second amended complaint
cures the defects in the first.

To the contrary, plaintiffs1

counsel "acknowledges that the Second Amended Complaint is deficient in many respects and unresponsive to the directives of the
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magistrate." (Plaintiffs1 Memorandum in Support of Objection to
Magistrates Report and Recommendation, March 23, 1988, p.4).
Plaintiffs1 counsel relies instead on a subsequent submission on
May 23, 1988 of a third amended complaint which he asserts he can
file vithout leave of court despite 1) the court's ruling of
November 25, 1987 allowing plaintiffs until December 21, 1987 to
file an amended complaint and requiring that plaintiffs be notified
of the court's decision and 2) plaintiffs' counsel's own motions
for extension of time to file the second amended complaint.

The

court therefore concludes that the second amended complaint was
not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. Accordingly, the court grants defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions
against the plaintiffs in the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the defective second amended
complaint, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to be determined
upon further hearing.
Upon the basis of the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the first, second, third, fourth,
fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth (as to derivative claims and as to
direct

claims

eleventh

against

the non-state

claims of the amended

defendants), ninth, and

complaint, together with the

corresponding claims of the second amended complaint, are dismissed
on the merits and with prejudice.
10

IV •

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a l l claims against the State of
Utah and i t s o f f i c e r s in their o f f i c i a l capacities are dismissed
on the merits and with prejudice.
This order does not dismiss the eighth, claim of the amended
complaint as replaced by the eighth claim of the second amended
complaint, insofar as i t asserts a claim against the state defendants in t h e i r individual capacities, nor does i t dismiss the tenth
claim of the amended complaint as replaced by the ninth claim of
the second amended complaint.

Aside from these exceptions, a l l

claims and t h i s entire action are hereby dismissed on the merits
and with prejudice as t o a l l defendants.

Defendants are e n t i t l e d

to their costs.
DATED t h i s

J** day of

M^tZJL^ . 198J1.
BY THE COURT:

/^L*ooc<^*£+

DAVID SAM
U . S . DISTRICT JUDGE
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Allen M. Swan, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Geoffrey W. Manguri, Esq.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Peter W. Billings, Jr., Esq.
Michele Mitchell, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Jack C. Helgesen, Esq.
Helgesen & Waterfall
4768 Harrison Bldg.
Ogden, UT 84403
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McO
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Paul Cotro-Manes, Esq.
311 South State Street
#280
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Leroy S. Axland, Esq.
Jerold G. Oldroyd, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HAN
175 South West Tenple
Suite 700
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDUM 4

PIL.

«w UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, DISTRICT OF UTAH

APR 2 i 1989
MARKUS B. Z.WMER, CLERK
<&L

BY

DE^L'TY CL£PK

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DISTRICT
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

GARY S. HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiff(s),
vs.

R U L I N G

ELAINE B. WEIS, et al.,
Defendant(s).
Case No. 87-C-0041-S
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On March 31, 1989, several defendants moved

for entry of

judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice in the above entitled
matter.

The time for responding to defendants' motion having now

expired without any opposition having been filed, and it appearing
to the court that all claims in the case have now been dismissed,
defendants1 motion is granted.

The court requests the movants to

coordinate with other defense counsel to prepare an appropriate
final order and judgment for the court's signature and to circulate
the same for approval as to form pursuant to Rule 13 (e) of the
Civil Rules of Practice.

DATED this
4/25/89:dp
Copies trailed to counsel
listed on attached page

i/^day of

C^J

198JL.
BY THE COURT:

A A < ^ Y S^/er
DAVID SAM

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

_<\5jAa*3

ADDENDUM 5

Richard J. Leedy
Attorney for Plaintiffs
230 East 300 South, Suite 1010
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH'
CENTRAL DIVISION
GARY S. HARRIS; GARY S. HARRIS,
acting derivatively for and on
on behalf of THRIFT HOLDING
COMPANY, a corporation and CHARTER
THRIFT & LOAN, a corporation; MFT
MORTGAGE COMPANY, a corporation;
FRANK A, NELSON Jr, JIM P. HANSEN,
and RODNEY F. GORDON, acting
individually and derivatively for
and on behalf of MURRAY FIRST
THRIFT & LOAN CO., a corporation,
and MFT FINANCIAL, INC., a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
ELAINE B. WEIS, individually;
ELAINE B. WEIS, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Department of
Financial Institutions of the State
of Utah; GEORGE R. SUTTON; GEORGE
R. SUTTON, in his capacity as
Assistant Commissioner of the
Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah; THE
STATE OF UTAH; DARWIN M. LARSEN;
R. SCOTT BAKER; R. SCOTT BAKER, in
his capacity as a duly authorized
representative and agent of the
Utah Commissioners of Financial
Institutions; MARY AMIDAN; MARY
AMIDAN, in her capacity as a duly
authorized representative and agent
of the Utah Commissioner of
Financial Institutions; ROBERT S.
GALE; ROBERT S. GALE, in his capacity as a duly authorized representative and agent of the Utah

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Civil No. C 87-0041 S

003
^OM?

Commissioner of Financial Institutions; STANLEY A. ANDERSON; ROBERT
B. BECKSTEAD; MIRVIN D. BORTHICK;
DEAN G. CHRISTENSEN; RICHARD A.
CHRISTENSON; W. HAROLD DOBSON;
JOHN A. FIRMAGE, JR.; LARRY E.
GRANT; LARRY R. HENDRICKS; ROBERT
L. HOWE; CARL A. HULBERT; EDWARD M.
JAMISON; JOHN C. JARMAN; RUSSELL B.
JEX; CHARLES E. JOHNSON; IRENE
JORGENSEN; FRED S. KOHLRUSS; RONALD
C. LEASE; T. KAY LYMAN; PAUL A.
MILLER; RICHARD D. PAUL; RICHARD M.
ROBINSON; ED H. THRONDSEN; RICHARD
A. VAN WINKLE; DR. TERRY WARNER;
FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a corporation; FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a corporation; THRIFT HOLDING
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
currently in control of an
adversarial receiver; CHARTER
THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY, a corporation currently in the hands of an
adversarial receiver in possession;
DOES 1 through 40,
Defendants.

Plaintiffs allege:
I.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under Title

28 U.S.C. section 1331 et seq. as to the First through Fifth
Claims, and the Eighth Claim; and under Title 18 U.S.C. sections
1961-1964 as to the Sixth and Seventh Claims.

This court's

jurisdiction over the Ninth and Tenth Claims is pendent to its
jurisdiction over the federal claims for relief.
2.

Venue as to each defendant is laid in the central

division of this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. section 1391
2

00313

(b) and (c), and 1393, and 18 U.S.C. section 1965 in that (a) one
or more of the defendants resides, maintains an office, transacts
business, has an agent, or is found within this district and
division, (b) plaintiffs' claims arose in this district and
division, (c) the offer and sale of securities herein complained
of took place in this district and division, (d) the violations
of securities law set forth in this complaint took place in this
district and division, (e) the defendants made, sent, telephoned
or caused to be made, sent or telephoned into this district and
division false and misleading statements in connection with the
sale of securities.

Through such misrepresentations and related

nondisclosures plaintiffs were induced to agree to, and did, pay
consideration for the issuance of Industrial Loan Guarantee
Corporation notes.
II.
PLAINTIFFS
3.

Plaintiff Gary S. Harris ("Harris") is a resident of

Weber County, Utah.

Harris was a major shareholder, director,

officer and managing agent of Thrift Holding Company, ("Thrift
Holding") and its subsidiary, Charter Thrift & Loan ("Charter")
both of which are Utah corporations.

Harris brings this action

individually on his own behalf and derivatively on behalf of
Thrift Holding and Charter.

Defendant Weis, acting under color

of state law, seized Thrift Holding Company and Charter on or
about June 30, 1986, and thereupon usurped the functions of the
shareholders, directors, officers, and principal managing agents
3
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of Thrift Holding and Charter and has at all time since June 30,
1986 exercised exclusive management control over all operations
of Thrift Holding and Charter, claiming that she in doing so she
has acted as "receiver in possession."

Any demand served upon

Weis to initiate this action against herself, the State of Utah
or the other defendants who were her co-conspirators, including
directors of Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation of Utah
("ILGC") a Utah corporation, would be futile, and a useless act.
The making of any such demand prior to initiating this action is
therefore excused.
4*

Plaintiffs Frank A. Nelson, Jr. ("Nelson"), Jim P.

Hansen ("Hansen"), and Rodney F. Gordon ("Gordon") are residents
of Salt Lake County, Utah; directly and indirectly they are the
principal shareholders of the Murray First entities and infused
more than $11,000,000 of their personal assets into Murray First
Thrift & Loan pursuant to an agreement dated July 17, 1981, to
which all defendants were or became parties.
5.

Plaintiff Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. ("Murray

First") is a Utah corporation, wholly owned by plaintiff MFT
Financial, Inc. ("MFT Financial").

The majority of the stock of

MFT Financial is owned by Nelson, Hansen and Gordon. MFT
Mortgage Company, a Utah corporation, is a wholly owned
subsidiary of MFT Financial.

These three corporate entities and

Nelson, Hansen and Gordon are collectively referred to herein as
the "Murray First entities."

4

6.

Nelson, Hansen and Gordon bring this action

individually, each on his own behalf, and derivatively on behalf
of Murray First Thrift & Loan, MFT Financial, and MFT Mortgage
Company.

Defendant Weis, acting under color of state law, seized

Murray First on July 22, 1982 and MFT Financial on or about
August 26, 1982. Defendant Weis has usurped the functions of the
shareholders, directors, officers and principal managing agents
of the Murray First entities and has at all times since usurping
said functions exercised exclusive management control over all
operations of Murray First and MFT Financial, claiming that she
in doing so she has acted as "receiver in possession by
deliberately failing to file tax returns and other documents
requisite to maintaining Murray First entities in good standing.
Any demand served upon Weis to initiate this action against
herself, the State of Utah or the other defendants who were her
co-conspirators, including directors of Industrial Loan Guaranty
Corporation of Utah ("ILGC") a Utah corporation, would be futile,
and a useless act. The making of any such demand prior to
initiating this action is therefore excused.
7.

Defendant Elaine B. Weis ("Weis") is the Commissioner

of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah.
8.

Defendant George R. Sutton ("Sutton") is the Deputy

Commissioner of Financial Institutions for the State of Utah.
Weis and Sutton are collectively referred to herein as the
"Public Servant" defendants.
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9.

Defendants Darwin S. Larsen ("Larsen"), Scott Baker

("Baker"), Mary Amidan ("Amidan") and Robert Gale ("Gale") are
residents of Weber County, and acted as the representatives and
agents of defendant Weis in conducting the affairs of Charter
Thrift and Loan; such agency and employment of Baker, Amidan and
Gale was formally acknowledged by Weis on or about July 31, 1986;
plaintiff Harris is informed and believes, and on that ground
alleges that a de facto agency existed for many months before
July 31, 1986. Larsen, Baker, Amidan and Gale are each sued
individually and as agents of Weis and the other defendants.
10.

Stanley A. Anderson, Robert B. Beckstead, Mirvin D.

Borthick, Dean G. Christensen, Richard A. Christenson; W. Harold
Dobson, John A. Firmage, Jr., Larry E. Grant, Larry R. Hendricks,
Robert L. Howe, Carl A. Hulbert, Edward M. Jamison, John C.
Jarman, Russell B. Jex, Charles E. Johnson, Irene Jorgensen, Fred
S. Kohlruss, Ronald C. Lease, T. Kay Lyman, Paul A. Miller,
Richard D. Paul, Richard M. Robinson, Ed H. Throndsen, Richard A.
Van Winkle, and Dr. Terry Warner served at various times as the
directors of ILGC from March 22, 1982 to July 31, 1986. They are
collectively referred to herein as the tfILGC directors."

Each of

the defendants named in this paragraph is a resident of this
judicial district as set forth in attached Exhibit 1.
11.

Defendant First Security Financial Corporation is a

Utah corporation, an industrial loan corporation with thrift
powers, doing business in Salt Lake City as a thrift institution.

6

12.

The true names of defendants Does 1 through 40 are

presently unknown to plaintiffs, who will amend this complaint to
allege their true names, when they become known.

Defendants

First Security Financial and Does 1 through 20 are each thrift or
banking institutions who at relevant times owned one or more
industrial loan corporation with thrift powers doing business in
this judicial district as a thrift institution.

One or more

employees of each defendant named in this paragraph served as a
director of ILGC during the relevant time period.

The defendants

named in this paragraph are collectively referred to herein as
the "private party" defendants.
13.

Does 21 through 40 are bonding companies and sureties

for the State of Utah.

The Utah State Auditor has refused to

identify Does 21 through 40 to plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs
will amend this complaint when their identities have been
ascertained.
14.

Defendant State of Utah is one of the United States,

and was admitted to statehood in 1896.
15.

The ILGC directors, Weis, Sutton, Larsen, Baker,

Amidan, Gale and the private party defendants were the agents of
each other, and the State of Utah, in committing the wrongful
acts alleged, and each acted in the course and scope of such
agency in committing the misrepresentations and failures to
disclose which are alleged herein.

The ILGC directors, Weis,

Sutton, Larsen, Baker, Amidan, Gale, the private party
defendants, and the State of Utah ratified each of the acts of

7

the other defendants committed pursuant to such agency and
employment.
16.

Weis, Sutton, Larsen, Baker, Amidan, Gale and each of

the ILGC directors conspired and agreed to commit the wrongful
acts alleged herein, and the overt acts alleged were committed in
furtherance of their conspiracy.
17.

Defendants Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift &

Loan Company are defendants because they are in the antagonistic
hands of a defendant receiver and/or receiver in possession
and/or trustee however characterized who willfully refused,
declined and neglected to bring this action on behalf of said
parties.
18.

ILGC is a Utah non-profit corporation, organized under

the laws of the State of Utah, organized with the stated purpose
"to guarantee full payment of account obligations of members up
to ten thousand dollars for each account," later increased to
fifteen thousand dollars.

Neither the enabling legislation, nor

the Articles of Incorporation grant general corporate powers to
the ILGC.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that

ground allege that the ILGC lacked authority to issue securities.
V.
TilO/^^
Lv

I ^- *

1/A i,~"^

FIRST CLAIM

^ rv
7
Mtn^
ft

^Against Defendants Weis, Sutton, and

1X11

A\\

))

±9.

the ILGC directors)
Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of

this complaint into this claim.
8

20.

On or about July 17, 1981 the Defendant State of Utah,

through its Department of Financial Institutions and in
conspiracy and consort with the other defendants, proposed an
agreement in writing which agreement was affirmed and accepted by
Plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson and Gordon and others.
21.

Pursuant to this agreement, Plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson

and Gordon were to become owners of controlling stock interests
(not less than 80%) in Murray First Thrift & Loan, MFT Financial,
MFT Mortgage and MFT Leasing Company by investing their personal
cash, certain personal assets and assets of associates into said
companies capital account in an amount of approximately
$11,100,000.

Other corporate affiliates of those companies were

to be dissolved including Reading Holding Company, Irving
Financial Corporation, and other "affiliates and related
entities."

A time frame was set forth to accomplish

reorganization and the issuance of shares in MFT Financial for
the infusion of capital which was subsequently extended by mutual
agreement.

The capital was infused by Plaintiffs for stock

interest provided in the form and in the manner demanded by
defendants.

However, on July 22, 1982, prior to final

reorganization and issuance of shares, Murray First Thrift was
seized by the State of Utah and such seizure included the capital
infused by Plaintiffs for which shares had not yet been issued
pending completion of reorganization.
22.

On October 6, 1982, by order of the Third District

Court the ILGC was appointed as agent for the State of Utah to
9

negotiate a sale of assets of Murray First Thrift 6 Loan to
several qualified purchasers together with the Plaintiffs who
were designated as owners and owners' representatives acting for
and in behalf of Murray First Thrift & Loan.
23.

On November 3, 1982 by subsequent order of the Third

District Court, Defendant Weis was prohibited from interfering or
even participating in negotiations for the sale of the banking
function of Murray First Thrift & Loan.

Her role was limited to

submission of any agreement reached between Plaintiffs Hansen,
Nelson, and Gordon and ILGC and First Security Bank to the
Federal Reserve Board with her recommendation for approval.
24.

On November 5, 1982 a series of agreements between

ILGC, First Security and the Plaintiffs were executed and a
purchase and assumption agreement agreed to involving all of the
parties hereto.

As part and parcel of said agreement the capital

invested by Hansen, Nelson and Gordon set forth in paragraph 19
above, was "retained" for their benefit and use and for the
benefit and use of the Murray First entities and by specific
terms of the agreements were to be conveyed to an independent
trust to be managed by Hansen and Gordon pending approval of the
purchase and assumption agreement by the Federal Reserve Board.
25.

Commencing on or about November 15, 1982 and ending in

June 1985, ILGC issued securities in the form of (1) promissory
notes pursuant to the purchase and assumption agreement executed
by the Murray First entities with a total face value of
$7,000,000 issued November 15, 1982; and an additional $3,000,000
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issued over a period of time ending in December 1986; and (2)
promissory notes issued to other thrift investors in the total
face amount of at least $13,000,000 which plaintiffs are informed
and believe were issued at various times between November 1984
and June 1986.

In all cases the promissory notes were secured by

or offset against the Plaintiffs Hansen, Gordon and Nelson assets
infused into Murray First Thrift according to the July 17, 1981
uncompleted agreement.

1.

On or about November 1984 Charter

was induced by Weis to purchase $2,400,000 worth of ILGC
promissory notes from ILGC in connection with Charter's
acquisition of Continental Thrift & Loan.

Weis had seized

Continental Thrift on the basis that its capital was impaired.
Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on such grounds allege
that ILGC notes, in the total face amount of not less than
$23,000,000 were issued by the ILGC directors as obligations of
ILGC, at the behest of Weis, and were purchased by other thrift
institution investors, in addition to the $2,400,000 sold to
Charter.
26.

On November 15, 1982 Murray First Thrift, MFT

Financial, and MFT Mortgage, Rodney F. Gordon, Frank A. Nelson,
and Jim P. Hansen entered into a purchase and assumption
agreement with ILGC, First Security Financial, and Weis.

Gordon,

Hansen and Nelson retained assets in Murray First Thrift & Loan
together with the other interests of the Murray First entities
specifically acknowledged.

In addition, consideration totaling

$10,000,000 to ILGC for ILGC promissory notes in the amount of
11
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$10,000,000 were issued to First Security Financial.

As a result

of the purchase and assumption agreement, $7,000,000 in ILGC
notes were issued to First Security Financial on or about
November 15, 1982 and $3,000,000 in notes were issued to First
Security Financial by December 31, 1986.

All of the

consideration for $10,000,000 in ILGC promissory notes issued to
First Security Financial were paid by the capital assets which
were the property of Hansen, Nelson and Gordon and the Murray
First Thrift entities.
27•

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that ground

allege, that ILGC directors issued and Weis induced sales of ILGC
notes to the following entities in the amounts set forth:
(a)

$3,000,000 to Commerce Financial Thrift;

(b)

$2,000,000 to Copper State Thrift;

(c)

$4,000,000 to Interlake Thrift;

(d)

$2,000,000 to Western Heritage Thrift.

28.

The securities purchased by plaintiffs as well as

similar securities purchased by other investors were issued by
ILGC for the following purposes:

(i) to induce the Murray First

entities to enter into the purchase and assumption agreement, and
(ii) to replace the capital which Plaintiffs Hansen, Gordon and
Nelson had infused pursuant to the July 17, 1981 agreement, and
(iii) to induce Charter to acquire Continental Thrift; plaintiffs
are informed and believe that (iv) ILGC promissory notes in the
face amount of $3,000,000 were sold on or about February 17, 1984
to "Commerce Financial Thrift by Weis to induce Commerce to
12

n-i^TQ

acquire Cottonwood Thrift and Loan, which had been seized by Weis
on the grounds that its capital was impaired; (v) plaintiffs are
further informed and believe that ILGC promissory notes in the
face amount of $2,000,000 were sold in December 1984 to Kent
Brown and W. Hendricks by Weis to induce Hendricks and Brown to
acquire Western Heritage Thrift and Loan, which had been seized
by Weis on the grounds that its capital was impaired; (vi) ILGC
promissory notes in the face amount of $2,000,000 were sold (at
dates unknown to plaintiffs,) to Copper State Thrift by Weis to
induce Copper State Thrift to acquire American Fidelity Thrift
and Loan, which had been seized by Weis on the grounds that its
capital was impaired; (vii) $4,000,000 in ILGC promissory notes
were sold to Freedom Savings and Loan in connection with its
acquisition of Interlake Thrift which had been seized by Weis on
the grounds that its capital was impaired.
29.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe that the promissory

notes were issued by ILGC, and sold by Weis, in part to evade
ILGC's obligations to depositors of Cottonwood Thrift, American
Fidelity Thrift, Continental Thrift, Western Heritage Thrift and
Interlake Thrift.
30.

The securities issued by ILGC and sold by Weis to the

Murray First entities and Charter Thrift were securities within
the meaning of Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
Section 77b(l) and Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. section 78c(a)(10).
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31.

Said securities were offered and sold to Hansen, Nelson

and Gordon through the Murray First entities and Charter by use
of instrumentalities of transportation and telephone and wire
communications in interstate commerce and the mail, including but
not limited to interstate telephone calls from Weis to Hansen,
soliciting the sale of ILGC notes in which she made fraudulent
misrepresentations alleged herein, and a telephone conference
call from Weis in Utah to Hansen in Idaho and to Mendell
Borthwick in Hawaii, wherein Weis stated that Honolulu Federal
Savings and Loan (who had earlier agreed in principal to acquire
Murray First Thrift and Loan by replacing the assets invested
pursuant to the July 17, 1981 agreement) to acquire Murray First
Thrift & Loan or any of its assets it would be required to
purchase ILGC securities, and letters more fully described below.
32.

In connection with the offering and sale of said

securities defendant Weis acted as an underwriter within the
meaning of Section 2(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
section 77b(ll).

Weis was an active participant in the offering

and sale in that, among other things, plaintiffs are informed and
believe that:

(i) Weis systematically solicited investors,

including Charter, W. Hendricks, Kent Brown, Freedom Savings &
Loan, and Copper State Thrift, among others, to purchase the
notes issued by ILGC; (ii) Weis was and held herself out to be
ILGC's advisor and the exclusive agent for placement of these
securities; (iii) acceptances were communicated to Weis and the
terms of purchase were negotiated by Weis in each instance; (iv)

14

the directions, representations, warranties and recommendations
made by Weis were the significant factor in inducing the Murray
First entities to pay for the notes issued to First Security
Financial, and in inducing Harris to make the investment decision
to acquire the ILGC securities in the name of Charter, and but
for her representations and directions the Murray First entities
would not have entered into the purchase and assumption agreement
nor would plaintiffs have parted with any consideration for ILGC
notes.
33.

But for the directions, representations, warranties and

recommendations of defendant Weis, Charter would not have
acquired Continental Thrift, and Harris would not have made the
investment decision which caused Charter to purchase ILGC notes
in the amount of $2,400,000.
VI.
j

SECOND CLAIM

,/U'l
/r (Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors

J)
*\J"

and the Private Party defendants under

\J*

Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act)
34.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of

this complaint into this claim.
35.

In making such offers and sales, Weis and the ILGC

director defendants made untrue statements of material fact, and
omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading to the Murray First entities and to Charter
15

as described below.
36.

In connection with each sale, Weis and the ILGC

directors represented to plaintiffs, among other things:
(a)

That ILGC had obligated, and would obligate

itself to pay Charter and First Security Financial the
sums stated and to perform other obligations according
to the terms stated in the ILGC promissory notes;
(b)

That the securities, and specifically the

dollar amounts shown on the face of the notes, were
fully backed by the credit of ILGC;
(c)

In the case of Murray First entities, that

Weis and ILGC could and would fully perform under the
terms of the purchase and assumption agreement and
return the capital to Hansen, Nelson and Gordon infused
through the July 17, 1981 agreement.
(d)

In the case of Charter, the defendants

represented to Gary Harris that the ILGC notes would be
accepted by the federal regulators as capital assets
for the purpose of determining the liquidity of Charter
required by federal law and Federal Reserve
regulations.
37.

These representations were untrue, among other reasons,

because:
(a)

Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had the

ability to pay any holder of the ILGC promissory notes
pursuant to the terms of the notes executed by the
16

ILGC, nor did Weis or ILGC otherwise have the ability
to otherwise perform their obligations thereunder,
because ILGC was insolvent at the time the notes were
issued;
(b)

Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had any

means in reality of raising the required funds on
behalf of ILGC sufficient to enable ILGC to pay the
notes according to their terms;
(c)

Weis and the ILGC directors had been informed

by the FDIC that the ILGC notes were unacceptable to
the federal regulators, and would not be considered by
the FDIC in determining the liquidity of any Utah
thrift institution.
38.

In making the offers and sales, Weis and the ILGC

directors induced, forced, and otherwise manipulated Hansen,
Nelson and Gordon and the Murray entities, Harris, Charter and
other investors to pay consideration for said securities and
representations and warranties including those set forth above
and representations and warranties and terms of the purchase and
assumption agreement and "mutual release" supplement thereto,
that omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make
such representations not misleading, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made.

In this connection,

neither Weis nor the ILGC directors ever disclosed to Plaintiffs
in connection with any sale of ILGC notes, any of the following:
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(a)

That ILGC was insolvent;

(b)

Neither Weis nor the ILGC directors had any

intention of paying Charter, First Security, or any
other holder of the ILGC promissory notes pursuant to
the terms of the notes executed by the ILGC or of
otherwise performing their obligations thereunder,
because ILGC was insolvent at the time the notes were
issued, and in truth and in fact intended to pay and
did pay off notes with the Hansen, Nelson and Gordon
assets.
(c)

Weis had no intention of fulfilling her

obligation and exercising her authority to require the
members of the ILGC to make pro rata contributions to
pay the notes when they became due, in the event ILGC
was unable to pay them;
(d)

Weis had no intention of fulfilling her

obligation and exercising her authority to increase the
capital of ILGC by assessments levied against its
members.
(e) Weis and the ILGC directors had no intention
of performing the contractual obligations assumed by
Weis and the ILGC under the purchase and assumption
agreement with the Murray entities and the July 17,
1981 agreement to which Hansen, Nelson and Gordon were
signatories and sole investors of the capital assets.
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(f) Weis and the ILGC directors knew that the
ILGC promissory notes were unacceptable to the federal
regulators, and would not be considered by the FDIC in
determining the liquidity of any Utah thrift
institution.
39.

No later than January 1, 1983 and long before the sale

to Charter, Weis and the ILGC directors knew, but did not
disclose to Charter or Gary Harris, that a massive and systematic
fraud on investors had already been committed in the sale of ILGC
promissory notes.
40.

To the extent that the ILGC directors did not actually

know some or any of the facts set forth in the foregoing
paragraphs, or did not know the falsity of some or any of the
fraudulent representations, at the time of the solicitations and
sales to Plaintiffs, said defendants in the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known of said facts or said falsity.
41.

At all material times, plaintiffs ,were not aware that

the defendants1 representations to them were untrue nor were they
aware of the misleading character of Weis1 solicitations.

In

making their investments in ILGC securities the plaintiffs were
also unaware of the material matters not disclosed by Weis and
the ILGC directors.
42.

Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,

15 U.S.C. section 77-1(2), Weis and the ILGC directors are
jointly and severally liable to repay the consideration paid by
the Murray First entities and Charter with interest, or to pay
19

damages.

Plaintiffs stand ready, willing and able to take all

actions necessary to rescind the transactions wherein the
securities were purchased including both the July 17, 1981
agreement for the purchase of controlling interest in MFT by the
investment of $11,000,000 and the purchase and assumption
agreement by all parties by which those assets invested would be
retained and returned after Federal Reserve Board approval.
43.

Plaintiffs did not discover, and through the exercise

of reasonable diligence, could not have discovered that
defendants1 representations and omissions, as described above,
were false and misleading, until at least July 31, 1986.
44.

All of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted the

violations of Section 12(2) set forth in this count.
45.

All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to

perform the acts which constitute the violations set forth in
this count, and performed acts in furtherance of said conspiracy.
46.

All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to

conceal the acts of omission which constitute the violations set
forth in this count, and performed acts in furtherance of said
fraudulent concealment.
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THIRD CLAIM

(Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors
and the Private Party defendants under
Section 10 of the 1933 Securities Act, and Rule 10b~5)
47.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of
20

this complaint into this claim.
48.

The conduct of the defendants as alleged above

constituted a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud the
plaintiffs.
49.

Defendants, directly or indirectly, by the use of means

or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the mails,
employed a device, scheme or artifice to defraud plaintiffs, made
untrue statements of material facts and omitted to state material
facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, and
engaged in acts, practices, and courses of business which
operated as a fraud and deceit upon plaintiffs, all in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities, and all in violation of
Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 78-j
and rule 10b-5.
50.

Defendants made such misrepresentations or omissions

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, intending that
plaintiffs would rely thereon.
51.

Plaintiffs reasonably relied on said misrepresenta-

tions, omissions, and other violation of Section 10 and Rule
10b-5, and were damaged and injured thereby.
52.

All of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted the

violations of Section 10 and Rule 10b-5 set forth in this count.
53.

All of the defendants knowingly conspired and agreed to

perform the acts which constitute the violations of Section 10
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and Rule 10b-5 set forth in this count, and performed acts in
furtherance of said conspiracy.
54.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants the

consideration paid for said securities, or in the alternative, to
recover damages from defendants, including punitive damages.
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FOURTH CLAIM
(Against Defendant Weis and the ILGC Director Defendants
under Section 17 of the 1933 Securities Act)
55.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of

this complaint into this claim.
56.

Weis and the ILGC directors misrepresented the facts as

set forth herein, and refused to disclose said material
considerations with the intent to induce Charter and the Murray
First entities to purchase said securities.

Each of said

defendants knew of the untruth of their representations and were
aware of the nondisclosed information set forth above.
Plaintiffs were unaware that said representations were false and
misleading, and justifiably relied on said misrepresentations and
nondisclosures in purchasing said securities.
57.

To the extent that any of the ILGC directors did not

know of the falsity of said misrepresentations or omissions at
the time of each offer and sale, each was so unaware only because
said defendant intentionally and willfully acted to be shielded
from the truth by willfully refusing to conduct the thorough and
immediate investigation reasonably required in the circumstances.
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Such refusal was in willful and reckless disregard of said
defendants1 responsibilities to ascertain and disclose to
plaintiffs the truth of such misrepresentations and material
omissions.

Defendants1 duty to conduct such an investigation

arises from the following, among other things:
(a) Weis acted as the underwriter, and as a
participant in effecting the sales of worthless notes
to Charter and converting the capital assets of the
plaintiffs and of the Murray First entities and others.
Weis held herself out to plaintiffs as a skilled
advisor who would not offer or recommend an issue
without having thoroughly investigated the issue and
without fully disclosing all material risks.

Before

and during Weis' solicitations to plaintiffs Weis had
participated in the day to day operations of ILGC.

As

a result of this pre-existing relationship, and in
light of Weis1 superior knowledge concerning ILGC, and
the securities at issue, Weis knew that plaintiffs
relied on the financial advice and investment
recommendations of Weis and that plaintiffs believed
Weis would not recommend ILGC securities as an
investment to them without having thoroughly
investigated the issue and without fully disclosing all
material considerations to the plaintiffs, and in the
case of personal plaintiffs, Hansen, Nelson and Gordon,
relied on Weis to perform her fiduciary obligation to
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them with respect to the retained assets described
above.
(b)

The ILGC directors endorsed and authorized the

issuance of the ILGC promissory note securities, and
made direct and material representations and warranties
to plaintiffs in the transactional documents, with the
intent and purpose of convincing the plaintiffs that
they were purchasing valid and binding ILGC
obligations.

The ILGC directors also knew that the

plaintiffs reasonably believed in good faith that Weis
was acting on ILGC's behalf and for ILGC's benefit in
promoting said securities.
58.

Because of said misrepresentations and material

omissions, Weis and the ILGC directors violated Section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. section 77q, in offering and
selling said securities to plaintiffs.
59.

As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs

Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, and the Murray First entities have been
damaged in an amount of at least $2,400,000 and such other amount
as may be proven at trial, which amounts plaintiffs are entitled
to recover from said defendants, jointly and severally.
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FIFTH CLAIM

(Against Defendant Weis, Sutton, the ILGC Directors
and the Private Party defendants under
Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10b-5)
60.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of

this complaint into this claim.
61.

Because of the misrepresentations and material

omissions, Weis and the ILGC directors violated Section 10 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereto, in the sale of said securities to plaintiffs.
62.

As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs

Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, and the Murray First entities have been
damaged in an amount of at least $10,000,000 and such other
amounts as may be proven at trial, which amounts plaintiffs are
entitled to recover from said defendants, jointly and severally.
63.

As a proximate result of such violations, plaintiffs

Harris and Charter have been damaged in an amount of at least
$2,400,000 and such other amounts as may be proven at trial,
which amounts plaintiffs are entitled to recover from said
defendants, jointly and severally.
X.

P^

SIXTH CLAIM

* tjv"^ (Against all Defendants under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c))
}•>

64.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of
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this complaint into this claim.
65.

At all material times the ILGC was an enterprise

engaged in, and whose activities affected interstate commerce, in
that, among other things, its deposit guaranty business and
securities sales were conducted through interstate transactions.
In addition, Weis, ILGC, the ILGC directors, and the private
party defendants were an enterprise within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. section 1961(4) and 1962(c) for the purpose of issuing,
selling and defaulting on ILGC promissory notes.
66.

Weis, the ILGC directors and the private party

defendants were each employed by or associated with said
enterprise(s) in that, among other things:
(a)

Weis was associated with the enterprise(s)

as she sold ILGC promissory notes to the plaintiffs and
other thrift institutions by means of, among other
things, written and oral communications and interstate
telephone calls to the plaintiffs.
(b)

the ILGC directors were associated with the

enterprise(s) through their approval and authorization
of the issuance of worthless ILGC promissory notes,
which they had the authority to control.
(c)

the private party defendants were associated with

the enterprise(s) by virtue of their active
participation as members in ILGC, in part through the
employment of their employees as directors of ILGC.
The private party defendants were also associated with
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the enterprise(s) by participation in ILGC f s decision
making process, specifically in the systematic and
intentional undercapitalization of ILGC, which occurred
through their control over the affairs of ILGC.
67.

Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party

defendants participated directly or indirectly in the conduct of
the affairs of the enterprise(s) through a pattern of
racketeering activity by each committing two or more acts
involving securities fraud in violation of federal law,
indictable mail or wire fraud, all in violation of 18 U.S.C.
sections 1341, 1343, 1510, in furtherance of a systematic scheme
to defraud the private party plaintiffs of their assets by and
through Murray First entities, and in furtherance of another
systematic scheme to defraud Gary Harris and Charter, and schemes
to defraud other investors in the sale of various issues of ILGC
promissory notes, and then default on the notes and force the
purchaser thrift institutions into receivership.

These acts

included:
(a)

Weis, with intent to defraud plaintiffs and

other investors and for the benefit of ILGC,
systematically and willfully made and caused to be made
repeated and knowingly false and misleading statements
to plaintiffs and other investors and purposefully
concealed from them material facts about ILGC and the
promissory note securities for the purpose of inducing
plaintiffs and other investors to purchase them, as set
27

..'6« O

forth in detail above.

In furtherance of the

fraudulent scheme, Weis, the ILGC directors and the
private party defendants used interstate mails and
wires, including repeated mailings and telephone calls
from Utah to California, in connection with the Murray
First Thrift Purchase and Assumption Agreement, and
repeated telephone calls from Utah to Idaho to promote
the scheme to defraud Gary Harris and Charter.
(b)

In connection with the scheme to defraud the

Murray First entities, Weis, the ILGC directors and
some of the private party defendants caused to be
transported in interstate commerce forged, altered or
counterfeited documents, including different fraudulent
versions of the Murray First Purchase and Assumption
Agreement, and the disposition of Hansen, Nelson and
Gordon's retained assets therein.

Four different

fraudulently altered versions of the Murray First
Purchase and Assumption Agreement were sent by mail by
the defendants or their agents in furtherance of the
defendants' scheme to defraud the Murray First
entities: (i) one from Elmer Tucker, First Security
Bank mailed to the Federal Reserve of San Francisco
(Dec. 10, 1982); (ii) one from Don Allen, First
Security Bank mailed to the Federal Reserve of San
Francisco; (iii) one from Weis mailed to the Federal
Reserve Board in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 9, 1982);
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(iv) a later version mailed by First Security to the
Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco (April 1986).
(c) Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party
defendants willfully endeavored to obstruct and prevent
their employees and others not associated with the
enterprise from communicating information to the
criminal justice system or to the public concerning the
mail and wire frauds alleged in this count, by
misrepresentations, and by destroying or withholding
records relating to these frauds.

Furthermore, as

described above, Weis and the ILGC directors committed
violations involving federal securities fraud and Weis
falsely accused the plaintiff Gary Harris of stealing
funds from Charter, and absconding to Idaho with them.
68.

Each of the defendants knowingly aided and abetted each

of the acts and omissions of the others.
69.

As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the

ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Gary Harris
and Charter have suffered injury to their business and property
and loss in the amount of at least $2,400,000 each, plus other
damages to be proved at trial.
70.

As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the

ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering
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activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Nelson, Hansen
and Gordon having been induced by defendant Borthick and
subsequently by defendant Weis and members of the ILGC to
purchase controlling interest in the Murray First entities by a
series of agreements which the defendants had no intention of
honoring.

And the Murray First entities have suffered injury to

their business and property and loss in the amount of at least
$10,000,000 each, plus other damages to be proved at trial.
71.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c), plaintiffs are

entitled to recover treble damages, costs and attorney's fees
from defendants.
• V:
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SEVENTH CLAUSE
under 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c))
\ AA(Against all Defendants u
Q^
72. Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of
(^
72. Plaintiffs hereby ii
this complaint into this claim.
t

73.

Weis, the ILGC directors, and the private party

defendants conspired to conduct said enterprise(s) through the
pattern of racketeering activity described above in the sale of
ILGC securities to plaintiffs and other investors.
74.

As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the

ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Harris and
Charter have suffered injury to their business and property and
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loss in the amount of at least $2,400,000 each, plus other
damages to be proved at trial.
75.

As a proximate result of the participation of Weis, the

ILGC directors and the private party defendants in the conduct of
said enterprise(s)f affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1962(c) Nelson,
Hansen, Gordon and the Murray First entities have suffered injury
to their business and property and loss in the amount of at least
$10,000,000 each, plus other damages to be proved at trial.
76.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1964(c), plaintiffs are

entitled to recover treble damages, costs and attorney's fees
from defendants.
XII.
EIGHTH CLAIM
(Against all Defendants under 42 U.S.C. section 1983)
77.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations of

this complaint into this claim.
78.

At times relevant to this claim Weis purported to act

as the Commissioner of Financial Institutions; Borthick was her
predecessor also purporting to act in the same capacity.

Sutton

was the Deputy Commissioner of Financial Institutions for the
State of Utah.

These defendants were responsible at various

times for the supervision and control of others who acted as
agents, employees and consultants to the State of Utah, while
purporting to act on behalf of the State of Utah were in fact
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acting for their own benefit and for the purposes of the other
defendants and conspirators herein.
79.

In doing the acts alleged the public servant defendants

purported to act under authority of state law but were in reality
acting for themselves under color of law and under color of the
statutes, regulations, customs and usages of the State of Utah,
including the provisions of Title 7 of the Utah code, governing
financial institutions.
80.

The ILGC directors, and the private party defendants

combined and conspired with the public servant defendants to deny
the plaintiffs their federal constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws.

The concerted action between

the private party defendants, the ILGC directors and the public
servant defendants constitutes state action for the purposes of
42 U.S.C. section 1983.
81.

The public servant defendants and the ILGC director

defendants deliberately misinterpreted and abused their power and
authority to regulate plaintiffs' thrift institutions.
Plaintiffs have been singled out for oppressive decisions; the
public servant defendants have imposed unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious conditions on the individual plaintiffs and Murray
First Thrift, and Charter including, but not limited to, inducing
and requiring them to purchase stock in the Murray First entities
and requiring them to purchase ILGC notes, and inducing private
plaintiffs Hansen, Nelson, Gordon and Murray First Thrift & Loan,
MFT Mortgage and MFT Financial through their president Jim P.
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Hansen to enter into the purchase and assumption agreement and
ancillary agreements dated November 5, 1982 and November 15,
1982.

Plaintiffs have been the victims of intentional and

purposeful discrimination by the public servant and ILGC director
defendants.

State officials Weis, Borthick, Sutton and their

agent Richard A. Christenson deliberately misinterpreted the
powers of the Commissioner and ILGC and have purposely singled
out the plaintiffs for such misinterpretations.

Such unequal

application of the law and regulations constitutes a denial of
equal protection of the laws.
82.

Plaintiffs were deprived of their federal

constitutional rights because they were selectively treated by
the public servant defendants acting in concert with the ILGC
directors, and the private party defendants.

Unfair,

discriminatory and burdensome conditions and requirements were
imposed on plaintiffs which were not imposed on other similarly
situated thrift institutions.

More particularly, such conditions

and requirements were not imposed on the private party defendants
in the operation of their affiliated thrift institutions.
83.

The selective treatment of plaintiffs by the public

servant defendants was based on impermissible considerations;
namely, an intent to cover up the mismanagement and insolvency of
ILGC by issuing notes and Net Worth Certificates and planned to
plunder the assets of the private plaintiffs and of plaintiffs1
corporations and to accord preferential treatment to the private
party defendants and their affiliates.
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84.

The defendants acted with malicious intent to deprive

plaintiffs of due process and equal protection of the laws, and
the concerted acts of the defendants caused such deprivations to
occur.

The defendants1 concerted action under color of law has

deprived plaintiffs of rights, privileges, and immunities secured
to them by the Constitution and laws of the United States;
particularly their rights not to be deprived of property without
due process of law and just compensation, guaranteed by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; and their rights
to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
85.

In addition to general damages, plaintiffs are entitled

to punitive damages as may be proved.
86.

As the direct and proximate result of the acts of the

defendants alleged above, plaintiffs have suffered out of pocket
pecuniary losses and damages to their business and property,
including the loss to the Murray First entities of not less than
$13,000,000 in Murray First assets conveyed to First Security
Financial for no consideration; plaintiffs Harris, Hansen, Nelson
and Gordon have suffered anxiety and emotional distress; their
reputations have been impaired, and they have been compelled to
expend substantial sums of money and much of their time pursuing
fruitless applications and submissions to Commissioner Weis.
87.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants1

violations of law; including their fraudulent sale of securities,
plaintiffs have been injured in their business and property and
34
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have sustained actual damages the full extent of which cannot be
presently calculated, but which exceeds the sum of $23,000,000.
88.

Plaintiffs1 damages include, but are not limited to:

(a) increased development costs for Bel Marin Keys; (b) the loss
of the going business value of the thrift institutions owned by
the plaintiffs; (c) the loss incurred through expenditures for
court costs and necessary legal expenses ;and (d) the loss of
reputation as competent businessmen in the financial community.
.1/&V

XIII.

NINTH CLAIM
(Plaintiff Harris Against defendants Weis, Sutton, Larsen,
and Throndsen for Defamation.)
89.

Plaintiff Harris hereby incorporates all of the

allegations of this complaint into this claim.
90.

Harris was associated with the banking industry in

Northern Utah for 21 years, from 1964 to 1985, during which time
he acquired a valuable statewide and regional reputation as a
competent, conservative and honest banking executive.

His

statewide reputation within the banking industry was enhanced by
his tenure as a director of the Utah Bankers' Association from
1983 to 1985.
91.

Harris had a business reputation in the State of Utah

as a competent banker, worthy to hold positions of public trust.
He served as a chairman of the Northern Division, Utah, American
Cancer Society, and served on the Board of Directors of the Red
Cross; for 30 years Harris has held leadership positions in the
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LDS Church, exercising stewardship over church funds, and
properties.
92.

Defendant Weis, on numerous occasions in September and

October 1986, with no reasonable grounds for believing them to be
true, made false and defamatory statements about Harris.

The

exact content of the statements are presently unknown to Harris,
but the defamatory gist of the statements includes the following:
(a)

That Harris had taken $11,000,000 from

Charter, that the bulk of the stolen funds were taken
by Harris to Idaho, to build houses, and that Weis did
not know Harris' whereabouts;
(b)

That Harris had run Citizens Bank as his own

personal, private bank, that he had gutted Citizens
financially and then started the same process on
Charter.
93.

An ordinary listener would understand the defamatory

statements to mean that Harris had absconded to places unknown
with the funds of Charter and Citizens1 Bank, and could not be
found by authorities.
94.

Weis knew the foregoing statements were false at the

time she made them, because she knew that no funds were stolen,
or otherwise wrongfully taken by Harris from Citizens1 Bank or
from Charter.
95.

Weis knew, or should have known, that the demise of

Citizens1 Bank was caused by a $9,000,000 real estate trade made
in March or April 1985 by a director, Darwin Larsen, who was then
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acting de facto, as the chief executive officer of Citizens1
Bank.
96.

Moreover, Weis knew, or should have known, at the time

she made the defamatory statements set forth above, that the FBI
had investigated Citizens1 Bank after its closure in 1985 and
reported no wrongdoing by Harris.
97.

In addition, Weis had a full time bank examiner from

the Department of Financial Institutions of the State of Utah
employed full time at Charter from approximately March, 1985
until Weis seized Charter on June 30, 1986.

During the entire 16

months that her employee and representative was present at
Charter, every transaction in which Harris was involved was
examined in complete detail by him.

Not once did the State

examiner discover or report any wrongdoing by Harris.
98.

Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Bank audited the books

and records of Citizens Bankshares, and all of its subsidiaries
and affiliates, including Charter Thrift and Citizens' Bank,
every year during the time Harris was involved with these
entities.

The last Federal Reserve review during the time Harris

was involved with Charter and Citizens was conducted in June
1985.

At that time no defalcations were reported.

Under its

rules, as Weis knew, any misconduct, defalcation,
misappropriation, or self dealing must be reported.

No wrongful

act, or questionable transactions by Harris or members of his
family were found by the Federal Reserve.
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99.

In spite of the facts known to Weis, she made further

false statements about Harris, announcing in October 1986 that
the Department of Financial Institutions and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") were bringing criminal charges
against Harris.

At the time she made these statements, Weis had

no reasonable grounds for believing them to be true.
100.

The ordinary listener would understand this statement

to mean that criminal charges had been brought against Harris for
wrongfully taking funds from Charter or Citizens1 Bank.
Listeners did so understand Weisf statements.
101.

On or about September 15, 1986, on Channel 5 TV in

Salt Lake City, Utah, defendant Sutton made false and defamatory
statements about Harris, the exact content of which is unknown to
Harris at this time, but the defamatory gist of which is that
Harris had committed the most egregious defalcation in the
history of the Department of Financial Institutions for the State
of Utah.

This statement was made soon after the conviction of

Val Costley for embezzlement of $5,400,000 from Family Bank
102.

Ordinary listeners would understand Sutton's

statements to mean that Harris had embezzled more than $5,400,000
from Charter Thrift and Citizens1 Bank.

Listeners did so

understand Sutton's statements.
103.

Plaintiff is informed and believes that Sutton also

falsely stated that Harris stole $11,000,000 which was the direct
cause of the demise of Charter, and had used family, business
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friends, and shell corporations to effect his thefts.

Such

statements were false in their entirety.
104.

At the time he made the statements Sutton had no

reasonable grounds for believing them to be true.
105.

At the time Weis and Sutton made the statements

alleged herein they knew that such statements would be
republished by others, and they made the defamatory statements
intending that such republications would occur.
106.

The defamatory statements originated by Weis and

Sutton were republished by defendants Larsen and Throndsen, who
made such republications with knowledge that the statements were
false.
107.

Such statements proximately caused Harris special

damages to his business and property, including but not limited
to curtailment of credit, denial of loan applications, and
demands for additional collateral, disruption of a partnership,
and the creation of additional burdens in all of Harris' business
dealings, all to his damage in an amount subject to proof at
trial, but not less than $7,000,000 as to each defendant.
108.

Defendants1 statements have caused Harris to be

shunned and avoided, and have caused disruption in his family
relationships, created anxiety, and emotional distress, all to
Harris1 damage in an amount subject to proof at trial, but in no
event not less than $8,500,000 as to each defendant.
109.

Weis, Sutton, Larsen and Throndsen published the

foregoing defamatory statements about Harris willfully,
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purposefully and maliciously.

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to

punitive damages according to proof, but in no event less than
$10,000,000 as to each defendant.
XIV.
(Against all Defendants Under Utah Racketeering
Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act)
110.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the allegations

of this complaint into this claim.
111.

The actions of the defendants and each of them, as

alleged herein, constitute violations of Utah Code Ann. Section
76-10-1601 et. seq. (1953), as amended, and are the legal and
factual causes of injury for which the defendants are liable and
actual damage of no less than $2,400,000 each as to Plaintiffs
Harris, Thrift Holding Company and Charter Thrift & Loan, and
$10,700,000 each as to Plaintiffs Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, Murray
First Thrift £ Loan, MFT Financial, and $1,000,000 as to
Plaintiff MFT Mortgage, which sum should be trebled, and for
costs of suit, reasonable attorneys' fees and punitive damages.
XV.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs demand judgment as follows:
1.

Under the FIRST through EIGHTH, and the ELEVENTH CLAIM,

for such general and special damages jointly and severally
against each and every defendant above named defendant as may be
established at the trial, but in no event less than $2,400,000
each in favor of Plaintiffs Harris, Thrift Holding Company and
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Charter Thrift & Loan, and $10,700,000 each in favor of
Plaintiffs Nelson, Hansen, Gordon, Murray First Thrift & Loan,
MFT Financial, and $1,000,000 as to Plaintiff MFT Mortgage,
trebled on the SIXTH, SEVENTH, and EIGHTH CLAIMS against all
defendants except the State of Utah.
2.

Under the SIXTH and SEVENTH CLAIMS, an injunctive order

divesting all defendants from any interest in the property or
future conduct of the enterprise, including divestiture of any
trusteeships or receiverships exercised by defendant Weis in her
capacity as trustee conservator receiver, or however
characterized, and the ILGC.
3«

Under the NINTH CLAIM for such general and special

damages against each and every defendant above named as may be
established at the trial, but in no event less than $7,000,000
special damages, $8,500,000 general damages and $10,000,000 each
in favor of Plaintiff Harris.
4.

Under the EIGHTH and TENTH CLAIMS, for reasonable

attorneysf fees.
5.

From an order of this court making Charter Thrift £

Loan and Thrift Holding Company parties plaintiff to this action.
6.

For such other and further relief, including court

costs, as the court deems just.
DATED this 15th day of January, 1988.

T aLch^dPjT
c h a j ^ J . Leedy
btefney ffor P l a i n t i f f s
Attefney
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